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21. Violence, Modernity, the Nation-State and Intervention
If modernity is characterized by the rational
organization of life, how do we explain the relativity of
values, the rivalries entailed in power politics, and the
recourse to violence despite the advance of reason and
civilization? Since the end of the Cold War and its initial
promise of a breakthrough in establishing greater peace,
intra-state crises appear to have mushroomed. We have
witnessed genocides on a scale not seen since World War II,
with over a million being slaughtered in Rwanda alone in just
four months in 1964. Modernity theory says we should have a
rational order and peace. So did the end of superpower rivalry
with the terminus of the Cold War. There is a gap between our
expectations and what has been promised by both theory and
major historical disjunctures of the twentieth century,
whether it was the end of the two world wars or the end of the
Cold War. We get the promises, but there is no delivery.
In the political arena, modernity is characterized by the
development of the nation-state. That development achieved its
apogee with the division of the whole globe among
territorially-based nation-states and the dissolution of the
last empire, the Soviet Union, in the beginning of this
decade. In a global nation state system, there is a compact
among the states that each has exclusive jurisdiction over the
land and peoples within their respective territories. States
assume responsibility for the security and well-being of their
own people. But a state only exists as a fully developed state
if there is effective control and power exercised over the
body politic, and that polity is capable of surviving on its
own. As a body politic, there has to be both centralized
coercive control and an economy in place that will ensure
survival.
The compact among states does not make the arrangement
into a mechanical system of billiard balls or atoms, but into
a club. For in order to be a state, the states as a
collectivity must recognize individual states as a member of
the club. State autonomy and recognition together made up the
bookends of the club of states. (Held 1995, 36; Krasner 1983,
18; Weber 1995, 1) The rule of non-intervention arises from
this arrangement.
Since it is a mutual pact, there is by definition no
higher authority to determine who is a member or to police
whether a state behaves like a member. In fact, the club of
nation-states emerged in Western Europe to obtain a single
rather than divided authority in a polity1 and in opposition
to one source of that divided authority, Rome, which claimed
universal jurisdiction over the behaviour of states because
3that higher authority claimed to be the embodiment of
universal values on earth.2 This why the arrangements between
and among states is said to be anarchic.
The emergence of the nation-state system was originally
unique to Western Europe. Elsewhere, the modern era resulted
in the development of gunpowder empires in India, in China, in
Turkey. In Europe, this unique and novel political development
was facilitated by the synergy of a number of diverse factors:
the invention and application of the printing press, which
took the monopoly of the control over knowledge away from the
church; the thronging of aristocrats to the universities in
the fifteen hundreds where, housed traditionally in nations,
they developed a camaraderie and sense of community among the
fraternity members who spoke the same language developing
parochial loyalties in contrast to the universal values and
loyalties to Rome that was the intent of their education; the
diversity of centres controlling mining to make cannons so no
monopoly developed to control the manufacture of armaments; at
the same time, larger entities were needed than city-states to
afford the costs of the new armaments; the distance of Western
Europe from the threat of raids from the nomads on the eastern
steppes, so Western Europeans lived in relative security; the
very long coast line of what was in reality a peninsula of a
huge Asian land mass which (along with the printing press)
made this a society open to discovery and change rather than
fixed and permanent landmarks; in comparison to other areas,
the relative immunity to new diseases possessed by the
voyagers from Europe following the Black Death. These and
other factors combined to facilitate the development of the
nation state as a combination of three classes, merchant
capital in the city, the bureaucracy and legal systems of
towns based primarily on contract law, and the military
capacity of the countryside. (Gledhill 1994) 
The only class marginalized by this development were the
scholars, the preservers of knowledge and inculcators of
values in the university who opposed the sense of openness and
new discovery.3 Though not overtly intended to do so, the new
nation-state freed itself from the moral reins and the
intellectual straight jacket of the scholastics in the
university with their relatively petty quarrels and the
equally narrow foundations in either a sceptical defence of
tradition or a sceptical overthrow of tradition for faith. But
capitalism freed men from the fetters of the moralists.4 Thus,
Henry Robinson argued that the denial of the liberty of
conscience, not Luther's conscience that resulted in absolute
faith, but the denial of the liberty of conscience was a
restraint upon trade.5
The nation-state arose at the very same time as a
4scientific conceptual foundations for reconciling change with
stability in a radically new way was discovered. Such a
solution was found in the Newtonian schema. One could have
development and stability at the same time. Aristotle had
defined motion in terms of rest. The circularity of the
seasons and of the heavenly bodies was perfect motion in
itself because one always returned to the same starting point.
Rest defined motion. Stasis defined mobility. This was the
perfect rationale for a permanently settled agricultural
society.
Stability was inherent, natural, and represented perfection.
But Newton defined rest in terms of motion; a home base
is merely a respite from movement; movement, not stasis, is
the norm. Change is prior in both experience and logic. Stasis
is merely an equilibrium point in a dynamic, changing system.
A state is merely a place of equilibrium in an otherwise
chaotic globe.
Thus, was born the club of nation-states based on
municipal property and contract law (Palan 1994, 48; McNeill
1992, 113) rather than a hierarchical moral law. Each of those
states, which became dedicated to the growth of capitalism,
was consolidated as a state by the "nations", the fraternity
of land-owning aristocrats who borrowed from the merchants to
consolidate the hegemonic rule of a dominant language group
over a territory.6 The identity and boundaries of that people
had to be determined based on historically and culturally
inherited patterns of behaviour and national character traits
of a dominant ethnic group in relation to the difficulties of
assimilating minorities into the dominant culture, and in
conflicts and wars with proximate rivals.
Consolidation of the character of each state meant
conflict from within and from without. It meant intervention
in each other's affairs to consolidate one's own status. The
foundations for intervention were forged in the multicultural
heritage of every nation-state. (Weber 1995, 20) It also meant
indifference to the workings of other states as long as that
other state was not a threat to the security and economic
well-being of one's own. 
Thus, ironically, the rules of this club meant that a
number of semi-functioning and even a few non-functioning
states remain members of the club. Why? Because nothing is to
be gained from kicking them out of the club. However, if a
state is deemed to misbehave such that it is perceived as a
threat to another powerful state or group of states - that is,
to their security or key economic interests - or to the club
as a whole, intervention in the affairs of that state is
justified. The club has always had minimal rules of behaviour
5for states. Disobey these minimal rules and reprisals could be
expected, including at the very extreme, intervention.
Thus, the Concert of Europe of 1815 was used as an
opportunity by the club to have the revolutionary activities
of internal dissidents repressed.7 By the end of the first
World War, one hundred years later, the grotian idealists
rather than the realists were in charge. Rather than
intervention being justified to put down revolutionaries,
intervention was justified in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919
to protect the rights of national minorities within states.
These latter rules of intervention proved to be totally
unworkable.
The Montevideo Convention of 1933 may have formalized the
legal criteria for the attainment of sovereign statehood in
terms of land (the existence of a defined territory), people
(a permanent population in that territory), and an effective
government for the state which could demonstrate its
capability in enforcing its authority over the territory and
the people, and it may have endorsed the principle of autonomy
and non-intervention - the power of each state to exercise
exclusive control over its own domestic affairs, with the
right to take ultimate decisions and actions concerning the
lives of its citizens within the territorial boundaries of the
state without interference by other states. But that rule was
always subject to the very important qualifier, that a member
of the club had to be willing to abide by the rules of the
club of states.8 The protection given to the Kurds in northern
Iraq9 determined that large flows of refugees were threats to
peace and security and justified intervention. This was also
true in Haiti whatever the rationale used. Certainly, Rwanda
demonstrated that states are unwilling to intervene in spite
of prior knowledge, military presence and the legal right, if
there seems to be no threat to peace and security for the
powerful members of the club or the club itself. (Adelman &
Suhrke 1996)
2. Globalization and States in Crisis
Is this conclusion valid? In fact, are states still the
significant players which determine when and when not to
intervene? Has not globalization both weakened the nation-
state as well as provided new opportunities for a global legal
and enforcement order of some kind? Are forces not at work to
allow the resurrection of a new international higher source of
authority than the nation-state to impose minimalist moral
criteria on heinous crimes recognized world-wide to be
illegal? Has globalization brought into existence a world
civilization?10
6Some would impose stiff criteria on membership in the
nation-state club. (Bonante 1995, 30; Stern 1995, 218) These,
and other reformist formulations aiming towards global
governance or a higher legal authority than the nation-state,
are the dreams of grotians and idealists. They want to
eliminate the basic premise of the Westphalian system - that
such tests would be minimal. The only test was to be whether a
state's behaviour, or even the internal conflicts within that
state, were deemed by the other states to threaten the
preservation of the state system itself and the security and
peace in the relations between states.
But isn't globalization changing the rules of the game?
Look at the radical changes that have taken place in just the
last century as modernistic globalization seems to be on the
verge of completing its task: the internationalization of
capital11 which makes the international economy very volatile
and states subject to the whims of the market because of the
high proportion of debt held by foreigners; internationalized
production making states compete for jobs; radical changes in
transportation, communication, and an international culture of
consumerism; new forms of collective decision-making;
transnational pressure groups; environmental challenges that
defy national solutions (Held 1995, viii; Haas & Haas 1995,
257); enormous refugee movements (Adelman 1992a). An
agriculturally based society has been transformed into an
urban one. The human population has grown from one billion at
the beginning of the century and is now approaching six
billion in spite of the large die offs from wars, politically
induced famine, and genocidal slaughter.
As a result of these and other changes, both centripetal
and centrifugal forces are seriously undermining the strength
and autonomy of the nation-state.12 Some even contend that the
state is an obsolete institution. (Kennedy 1993, 131)
Modernity set out to establish a single source of authority
based in the congruity between the legal polity, a
territorial, and an economic unit. Now there is a lack of
congruity between the territorial organization of political
authority and the subterritorial and transterritorial
mobilization of social forces.13 Neoliberalism aims for greater
and greater integration within a global economy. States are
then less able to control trade and monetary policy. As the
market expands, the state as the primary political unit
becomes weaker.  (Mittelman 1996, 191)
These globalization forces affect the ability of
developed states to respond to crises and exacerbate the
problems of nation-state consolidation in developing
situations.14 With rapid urbanization in the developed world,
there is a loss of identity for new arrivals and also a sense
7of invisibility and a freedom from traditional norms which
previously boundaried the actions of the individual. One of
the by-products is a decline in the sense of common purpose.
Yet developed states are still involved in providing
assistance to Third World states. But at declining levels in
terms of both the size of their own economies and the
multiplication of needs elsewhere. Further, an increasing
proportion of development aid has shifted to dealing with
complex emergencies.15 Further, developed states are
economically as well as socially less committed to providing
overseas assistance. At the same time, multinationals grow in
strength and power, but 70% of international trade is
intracompany trade, and states are less able to tax global
companies since the way they earn their profits are less and
less under the control of states.16. Global corporations
contribute a declining proportion of national income to state
coffers, and significantly less when measured against their
wealth and power in the economy. The ability of any single
state to tax them in relationship to their real earnings
further weakens under the pressure of international
competition to attract multinationals to different countries
and locales. The combination of political, social and economic
weakness of developed states means that they are less able to
play a role as providers of development aid, especially given
the greater need. The result is a weakening of international
law and the tools for its enforcement in all but the
commercial field, at the same time as those laws themselves
and the areas of international concern are multiplying.
In such a context, it is not surprising that the idea of
a global consensus for acting in response to complex
emergencies is more myth than reality. The situation is not
helped when the sources of threat to developed states
themselves have shifted from other states to internal
dissident and desperate factions and cults, and externally to
emerging real and imagined imported medical threats, illegal
migration, the globalization of crime and the age-old threat
that has always haunted nation-states, revolutionaries and
terrorists who believe they are dedicated and sacrificing
their lives for a higher moral purpose. When you add to this
environmental problems (global warming, ozone depletion,
etc.), large population increases exacerbating already high
migratory flows, the possibility that we are coming to the end
and the limits of the agricultural revolution wherein
population increases will once again increase at a faster rate
than the ability of the world to feed itself, then the ability
of the Westphalian state system to handle these pressures
seems questionable. As fish stocks are depleted, as forests
are cut down, as fresh water becomes scarce in most countries,
won't these problems produce greater social and political
8instability with no governmental institutions able to deal
with them? States are forced to be more competitive than ever
with less ability to meet the needs of its own citizens.17
What about the Third World? Look at Africa. In the 1990s
we have witnessed the famine and aborted humanitarian relief
effort in Somalia, the genocide in Rwanda, the resumption of
the civil war in Angola, the civil war between the Christians
in the south and the Muslims in the north in the Sudan, the
enormous bloodletting in Liberia, the chronic massacres in
Burundi, the collapse in Sierre Leone and the current crisis
in Zaire. Given the earlier legacies of Uganda, Mozambique,
South Africa and Chad, and the immanent disasters to which
large African states such as Kenya and Nigeria are now prone,
Africa accounts for a very disproportionate share of
genocides, famines, coup d'états, civil wars, and plagues.
Almost half of the civil wars being waged in the world today
(16 of 35) with battle deaths exceeding 1,000 per year, and,
therefore, half the complex emergencies, are to found in
Africa. In addition to Zaire and Rwanda, the UN Security
Council has on its current agenda five other African states -
Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Western Sahara, and Rwanda's
fraternal twin to the south, Burundi.18
Largely dependent on the exports of commodities which are
subject to sizable market fluctuations with disastrous
consequences when prices decline, with political leaders and a
civil society disproportionately dependent on overseas aid
making the control of the political levers of power critical
for economic success, with most countries segmented and
fractured by different ethnic groups, clans, tribes and even
religions, often with one group on both sides of a border, and
with violence becoming endemic in many countries as modes of
dealing with conflict, the risk of any of these countries
collapsing into civil war are significant.
The key root causes are present in most African countries
- economies subject to sudden acute pressure because of the
collapse of commodity prices, a weakened state sector,
particularly as pressures for democratization and human rights
protection grow, ethnic segmentation, and a culture of
violence that is on the increase.19
All of the above are but indicators of the weakening role
of the individual nation-states to handle crises in the Third
World. Is global governance the solution?
3. Global Governance
Given the enormity of the problems and the increasing
9weakness of states to play a positive role, is the time not
ripe for the UN to evolve into a true form of global
governance? The leaders of the UN see the role of the UN going
beyond even this goal of creating a legal global authority
with coercive clout to make the inter-state system more
effective. They are not just grotians; they are utopians. They
envision the UN as a moral leader, envisioning the UN
imparting and upholding universal moral values.
Javier Pérez de Cuellar in April of 1991 claimed that
there was a "shift in public attitudes towards the belief that
the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should
prevail over frontiers and legal documents." (UN Press
Release, SG/SM/4560, 24 April 1991) Boutros Boutros-Ghali
argued that the UN's coercive role was intended "to address
the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social
injustice and political oppression." Boutros-Ghali's key
document continued: "It is possible to discern an increasingly
common moral perception that spans the world's nations and
peoples, and which is finding expression in international
laws, many owing to the work of this Organization." (Agenda
for Peace para 15)
In other words, the UN was not simply hoping to be a
grotian legal system but claiming to be a moral teacher.
International law merely reflected that morality. But unlike
the Pope in the sixteenth century, the source of authentic
authority did not come from God, but from a shared set of
values held by the people in the world. The UN was, in fact, a
modernist institution that obtained its claimed quasi-
sovereign authority from the will of the masses.
This suggests that the real source of reform is to be
found in the consciousness and values of people themselves and
their assumption of responsibility. "(D)evelopment in
international norms and practice appear to be shifting the
focus of sovereignty from the government to the people of a
state, from the Westphalian precepts to popular sovereignty."
(Makinda 1996, 151) The people acting directly through NGOs
and new transnational organizations that bypass governments
will bring about the new world order.
But these organizations lack both economic clout and
coercive power. Each special group represents a small segment
of humanity and a very particular pressure group. In the
global scheme, it appears as if an army of ants is being sent
to do the job of an elephant. Only the metaphor is totally
misleading. The multiplicity of groups do not constitute an
army. There is no central direction or sense of common
purpose. And there is absolutely no evidence for a global
system of values being in place as claimed by the last two
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Secretary-Generals of the UN. In Hobbes' phrase, empty
rhetoric has replaced objective analysis.
And if there is no global consciousness, the claims of
the UN to have a public constituency is simply self-
advertisement. Further, it is false advertising. Given the UN
performance in Rwanda (Adelman & Suhrke 1996), these words
sound not merely empty, but hypocritical.
Gramscians also believe that there been a change in
consciousness among the people of the world that will demand a
system of global governance?20 But the evidence is weak.
Certainly, with television coverage, there has been a dramatic
increase in the politics of sentiment, the CNN effect in which
bleeding hearts are induced to pour out dollars and, more
importantly, put pressures on their governments to act when
humanitarian disasters are portrayed, even, as in the case of
Goma in both 1994 and 1996, when large numbers of those
fleeing Rwanda or already ensconced in refugee camps in zaire
as "refugees" were the genocidal killers.
The politics of sentiment does exist. However, offsetting
the unthinking bleeding hearts are the fearful guts of all the
polities in the world; virtually no developed country is
willing to place its citizens at significant risk for the
purpose of a cause, even one as lofty as preventing the
genocide of civilians, even when the task was relatively easy,
far less expensive than the clean-up costs, and the risks were
relatively minimal. There is indeed a global consciousness
that has developed, but insofar as it has been developed by
the visual media, it simply means we are ready to cry and
reach deep into our pockets as each successive disaster of the
week is portrayed. But the diachronic, unconscious lessons of
the Cold War and the MAD doctrine of deterrence have gone much
deeper. We have been conditioned to be risk averse.
Neither a global consciousness, nor the UN, nor a new
global agency expressing that consciousness rather than the
will of the weakened states that constitute the membership of
the UN, can be relied on to guide us in these hazardous times.
The state continues to be the major political institution
mediating between  local cultures and the emerging global
civilization, between past
and future. The state may indeed be weaker, but there is no
other real game in town.21
4. Conflict Dynamics: Bifurcation versus Turning Points
We have enormous problems. We have a weakening state
sector to deal with these problems. And instead of a global
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consciousness to provide political will for nation states to
act together, we have only its hysterical sibling on the one
hand, the politics of sentiment, and, on the other hand,
developed societies largely conditioned to believe that no
cause is worth any self sacrifice.
Before we surrender to pessimism, let us turn to the
crises themselves. Not to their turning points. "Turning
point" is part of the rhetoric of progress and optimism. The
end of the Cold War was one of these recurring illusionary
turning points within theories of progress - stages of
development, or stages of a crisis - as if there were
inevitable set patterns all conflicts went through. I prefer
the more neutral language of bifurcation points.
A bifurcation point is the position that is most distant
from a state of relative equilibrium where there is maximum
chaos in a system, but also where there are the greatest
opportunities for innovation and change. Such points of chaos
are subject to very unpredictable patterns. In these
situations, what often counts most is not the underlying or
root causes or even intervening variables, but the triggers
themselves. It takes very little to shift a situation in one
direction rather than another.
Thus, although Brown generalizes from the very specific
conclusion we drew in our own report (Adelman and Suhrke 1996)
to emphasize the common root causes underlying state collapse
- "(S)tates are especially prone to violence if state
structures are collapsing due to external developments (such
as sharp reductions in international financial assistance or
sharp declines in commodity prices), internal problems (new,
incompetent leaders or rampant corruption)." (Brown 1996b,
576) - he, in contrast to most theorists concerned with
underlying and proximate causes, recognizes the importance of
identifying contingent factors. As he noted, there is not
enough data on the role of elites and leaders in instigating
violence or on the roles of neighbouring states as triggers.
This was perhaps the greatest strength of the Adelman and
Suhrke report on Rwanda; it identified and characterized the
importance of both those factors. Deep description is needed
to identify these contingent factors.22
More significantly, at bifurcation points, what is most
needed is a knowledge of triggers more than root or underlying
causes. To neutralize the effects of specific leaders,
knowledge is needed which goes beyond general causes to
identify what George (1993) calls actor-centred and
situational analysis. This is because different nations and
groups have different propensities. The classical realism of
Thucydides recognized this. For example, it was important to
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recognize the national character of Athens with its propensity
to be bold, innovative and relatively magnanimous while Sparta
was conservative, calculating and sometimes vicious. (Johnson
1993, 28) The idiosyncrasies of individual leaders can be even
more important.
Further, an analysis of endogenous factors is
insufficient. Even if the primary causes of violence are
internal, exogenous factors are critical. At the very least,
they play a permissive role. They cannot be left out of any
analysis. It is as important to understand the conceptual and
practical constraints of outside actors and the conditions,
capacities and motivations which can propel them to act
effectively as it is to understand the internal dynamics
within a state and within the region in which that state
exists. For, as the Rwanda study makes clear, the role of
neighbouring states is critical to understanding the conflict
as well as grasping the best mechanisms for helping to
minimize that violence. Understanding the role of permissive
conditions and outside actions and their interaction with the
triggers which exacerbate the proximate causes of violence is
essential to any analysis.
This does not mean that the focus shifts from "discrete
(ontologically distinct) unities (that is states like Rwanda)
to the dynamics of social development within the international
system as a whole." (Gills & Palan 1994, 3) In contrast to the
neo-structuralist agenda in which the stress is on the primacy
of the totality of the international system, my perspective is
sceptical of any attempts to assume a god's eye view, to, as
it were, analyze a situation sub specie aeternitatis. I am
wary of creating any distance between theory and history.
Theory must be embedded in the details and nuances of history.
Rather than some general cause, such as the inherent
dialectic of capitalism for the revolutionary utopians, or the
absence of developed and effective global political regimes of
authority for most liberal internationalists, or, from the
opposite ideological perspective, the inherent conflict
between sovereign states, or, in more globalist terms, the
clash of civilizations or the clash between civilization
itself and nature and, hence the focus on environmental
scarcity, this paper does not concentrate on reconciling the
various models of general causes that have been offered.
Rather than such powerful mechanisms, I note that relatively
minor events can start a chain reaction.23 In the centre of any
system where there is relative stability, one may find a
degree of predictability. However, at the outer edges of the
system, a small change cannot only have a large impact in that
arena, but can profoundly affect the system as a whole.24
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In conventional international studies, large scale
elements - environmental scarcity and the consequences on
satisfying needs, population explosions, and illicit economic
engagements, for example, are isolated and studied as they are
found in various cases. The presumption in all these theories
is that the causes are proportional to the results.
International theorists presume that the mechanical model of
Newtonian physics means that any situation continues on an
entropic trajectory unless disturbed by an external force
(realists) or balanced by countervailing values and
institutions (internationalists). But the world cannot be
reduced to a simple mechanical model. It is a complex, inter-
active system characterized by "chaos"25 at key points of
perturbation.26 Newtonian mechanical models may be appropriate
to the analysis of areas which are more-or-less in a steady
state of equilibrium.27 Mechanical laws may dominate in
apparently relatively stable periods between bifurcation
points of great instability even in areas of crises. Choosing
Rwanda entails taking up a case where the crises points are of
greatest concern.
Therefore, the stress should not be on root causes or
prevailing intervening factors, though I do not dismiss any of
the accounts which attend to them. The stress should be on
triggers at critical bifurcation points, the very elements
that mechanical modellers of both the realist and idealist
schools tend to dismiss as minor contingent variables which
are unpredictable and uncontrollable. In contrast, the study
we undertook was a demonstration that a system can be
characterized by a relatively stable regime dominated by
forces (realists) or sufficiently assisted by an adequate set
of international agencies (liberal institutionalists). But the
key point at issue is the trigger, a bifurcation point where a
combination of elements come together. At that critical
juncture, choices could have been made, actions could have
been taken, without which the system spun into disorder.
Serendipity is as important as the "normal" governing forces.
Conflict management is concerned with keeping 'chance'
from getting out of hand, and to be prepared, if a crisis
occurs, to take advantage of the situation to build a system
which is even larger and has a greater degree of order. It is
in such crises that we can see the missed opportunities and
can set systems in place that can in future effect large
changes.
It is not the underlying root causes or the absence of
adequate countervailing values and institutions that are so
critical, for those causes will persist and institutions will
continue to be inadequate, however many reforms and
improvements that are made. But those institutions are best
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improved, not by an overall design, but by zeroing in on a
bifurcation point and taking advantage of an opportunity or a
crisis both to mitigate the immanent chaos at that bifurcation
point and increase the factors reinforcing stability, not by
reinforcing the status quo, but by creating a new situation
which reduces the pressure altogether. Bifurcation points are
like earthquakes. The tectonic plates covering the surface of
the earth are under great stress at the junctures where they
meet. The forces will only build up if temporary measures
merely postpone the inevitable eruption in the quest for
temporary stability.
Readiness and preparation are the key. Complex
emergencies are the products of composite systems that evolve
to a critical state in which a relatively minor event can
start a chain reaction. It is my contention that early warning
should be designed to anticipate the bifurcation point, take
advantage of that critical event, and introduce novel and more
comprehensive systems for increasing order and preventing
chaos.
It is, of course, a truism that such crises are also
opportunities to reinforce the status quo, to insist on
stability in the face of chaos. Realists, in particular, dread
chaos and instability. Such policies governed American-Zairian
relations in the sixties and seventies. "A critical element of
this consensus (maintaining or enhancing US-Zairian ties) was
the firm belief that 'chaos' - meaning territorial
disintegration, regional instability, and ultimately communist
expansion into Central Africa - was the only alternative to
Mobutu's continued hold over power." (Schraeder 1994, 80) As
one confidential source in the State Department put it so
succinctly, "Zaire without Mobutu could entail a Zaire
engulfed by chaos."28
Reinforcing the forces responsible for the chaos only
delays the explosion and multiplies the impact. The classical
pattern is to imitate the cosmic serpent, Naga, of Hindu
mythology, and try to reestablish stability and solidity out
of a very fluid situation.29 Marx said that "All that is solid
melts into air." But when hard core realists are in charge,
"All that is liquid turns into a solid sarcophagus," given
common current practices in foreign affairs, which, like
Chernobyl, merely hides and postpones the turbulence and
danger beneath.
However, the reverse can also be the case. The sooner we
are able to intervene in a situation of impending chaos, the
greater control we will have over that situation.
Unpredictability increases with time. The more a situation is
allowed to get out of hand because we know so little about it,
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the greater the chance that chaos will result with extensive
disorder offering the least chance to produce a higher level
of order. Concrete contextualized analysis of particular
situations is required to enable us to understand what is
happening and why it is happening.
In addition to an immediate opportunity for creative
action, bifurcation points bring to the fore the
contradictions in international regimes, such as the refugee
regime. Thus, in addition to allowing us to grasp what is
happening and providing opportunities for innovative
intervention, such innovations can have the greatest impact on
the system as a whole. Order emerges out of disordered
systems, not via a central control or via governing laws,
natural or man-made. In fact, a lack of central control makes
the system more adaptive because of the use of the principle
of self-organization. Bifurcation points allow a system to
reach a higher level of organization, not by controlling the
chaos, but, as part of the system, innovating at the point of
chaos to increase the organization and, hence, equilibrium of
the system as a whole.30
5. The Dynamics of Third Party Interventions
An emphasis on bifurcation points has enormous
implications for both analysis and understanding. In the
analytical arena, the stress has been on demarcating the
constant stages that any crisis goes through in order to
predict its progress and anticipate results. This is but the
correlate of the emphasis on root causes. But what has been
suggested above is that whatever the predictability factors,
the most significant point of intervention is at a bifurcation
point where the unpredictability is greatest and what is most
important are the contingent variables. Whether or not there
is a dynamic pattern to conflict in which certain
interventionist strategies can be correlated with different
points in the crisis dynamic, the contingent knowledge is much
more important.
In any case, the chaos among theoreticians is even
greater than the chaos in the nation-state organization of the
world itself. There are conflicts between realists and
idealists, between structural neo-realists and liberal
realists, and built into world systems theory an inherent
struggle between states, the focus of the realists, and the
globally-oriented economy, the focus of the liberal realist.
There are also conflicts between grotians and utopians,
between utopians and realists versus gramscian utopian
realism, between neo-liberal internationalists and grotian
internationalists.
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The Rwanda report (Adelman & Suhrke 1996) recommended
that one of the greatest problems in intervention was the lack
of coherence in policy. Policy formulation tends to mimic the
divisions among the theorists. To add to the dilemma, there is
gap between theory and practice. Alexander George (1993) has
documented the character of that gap very incisively. Between
the university and society, the largest chasm probably exists
between theory as practised in the university and foreign
policy.
Part of the reason is the standard one applied to any
need to connect theory and practice - the abstraction of one
and the immersion in the concrete of the other, the need for
decisions in practice when there is imperfect information and
no time to gather more. But the foreign policy field has
special problems. First, in the dominant theories, the
relations between states are dominated by the pursuit of
rational self-interest and the preservation and extension of
the power of the state to facilitate such collective pursuits,
or, in Wallerstein's world systems theories, the dialectic
between the two as economics is globalized while the
realization of positions of power are confined largely within
state boundaries. In such a context, the study of power
becomes the study of domestic politics, while foreign policy
becomes a sub-study of economics - how to promote a country's
self interest within a global economy. This is particularly
true when the study of the strategic uses of power outside the
country becomes primarily a study of the best use of coercive
power in the effort to advance national self-interest.31 In
that case, the military strategists replace the political
scientists per se as the leaders in this area.
One of the results is the relative neglect of whole
fields of study which have least relevance to either economic
or strategy issues. African studies is a case in point.32
Secondly, in the policy area, the Rwanda study demonstrated
how policy was largely dictated, not by knowledge and
analysis, but by ignorance, misleading perceptions carried in
the media, and sentiment. When experience was ostensibly used
- such as the reference to Somalia -it was based both on a
misreading of that experience and an ill-fitting application
to Rwanda. And when experience was relevant - such as that
from Zaire - it was not utilized.
From the theoretical side, as an example, in the United
States, those with knowledge of Rwanda were largely
anthropologists and historians, not political scientists
(Catherine Newbury at the University of North Carolina is one
such exception) let alone foreign policy specialists. There
was a simple reason. Rwanda had not heretofore been a primary
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foreign policy interest of the United States. It is difficult
to undertake empirical studies on foreign policy areas where
one's own country has little engagement. And where there were
many studies of Zaire because of the American involvement,
they were overwhelmingly critical - analyses of covert and
hegemonic exercises in power politics to advance American
interests and engage in cold war politics through proxy wars.
If intellectuals cannot be the moral guides of a state, they
will almost inevitably play the role of its superego.
This was but a recurring instance of an endemic role of
universities. As the university developed, again and again it
would create groups of intellectuals concerned with the moral
marginality of the university and its failure to resurrect its
original medieval mission to create and set universal moral
standards for society.
There is an additional problem. It is difficult to
generalize from historical studies of the agents and issues in
a particular setting. The gap between politics as history and
politics as social science continues to plague academia so
that theory based on scientific abstractions lacked enough
historical specificity to be relevant, while the historical
details of the events in Rwanda lacked a comparative context
or enough generalization to fit current practices within a
larger context.
 In the Rwanda case, the Adelman/Suhrke report (1996)
pointed to the absence of any detailed diagnosis of what was
occurring at the decision-making levels. There were analyses.
In the United States, the State Department had scenario
studies. The CIA had undertaken strategic studies. As had
Pentagon advisers.33 The UN had a plethora of information and
reports which had not be subjected to systematic analyses. In
France, where the best studies had been done, they had
influenced a shift in French policy from unqualified support
for Habyarimana to support for the peace process; the
ambivalence of the shift suffered from both a time lag and the
conflicts over policy. More important than all these gaps in
substantive knowledge or the application of substantive
knowledge even when it was available, was the absence of a
coherent process for obtaining the knowledge and utilizing it.
But there are deeper problems. The conflicts between
various inclinations in foreign policy, as I have repeatedly
tried to point out, are but correlates to the disputes between
different theoretical schools. As long as there is such
confusion in conceptualizing the general problem, it is
difficult for policymakers to take scholars seriously, other
than to use them as rationales for their own propensities.
(Adelman 1996a)
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Even George (1993), who, as I indicated, has over the
past decades demonstrated the greatest concern with the
problem of the gap between theory and practice, and who
eschews confining himself to concerns with instrumental (he
calls it technical) rationality, but is concerned with the
broader realm of normative considerations in what he terms
value rationality, is still a realist. He begins with the
assumption that the essential task of statecraft "is to
develop and manage relationships with other states in ways
that will protect and enhance one's own security and welfare."
(xxiv) Thus, policymakers have to clearly enunciate a state's
interests, prioritize them, and assess costs and risks in
pursuing them.
Though George's framework was far broader than most
realists and included America's normative as well as material
interests and the role of knowledge as well as power and
interest in explicating and guiding political actions34, there
remained two problems. The material and power interests were
given priority. Secondly, the key normative interest, the
prevention or mitigation of genocide, arose late in the game.
Prior to that stage, the priority of material and power
interests meant that the intelligence analysis had not been
done or, when undertaken, had not risen to the top of the
pile. Committed in one direction, in good part propelled by
domestic reactions to the perceptions of the Somalia
involvement, it then became very difficult to reverse course,
especially when neither the government nor the public were
well informed on the issue.
6. Justifying Humanitarian Intervention - The Case of Zaire
States largely avoided the universal predictions of
disaster in Zaire. If the situation of the refugee warriors
from the interhamwe and ex-FAR army, who indoctrinated and
intimidated the refugees against returning to Rwanda, were not
attended to, an explosion could be expected. The eruption
began when the interhamwe and ex-FAR combined with Zairian
army units to undertake ethnic cleansing of the Banyawelenge
in the Masisi region of Zaire in the spring of 1996. But by
the time those efforts were extended to the Bukavu and Uvira
areas in the south, the Banyawalenge, whose citizenship had
been taken away by the Zairian government if 1981, had allies
and perhaps "volunteers" from Rwanda. They defeated the
militant Hutu attacks and began the violent overthrow of the
Zairian regime. Though Brian Atkins from USAID tried to make
intervention a central goal of US policy in the June 1996
Rwanda Roundtable in Geneva, his initiative was undermined
from three sources - lack of ardent support by other states,
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professional analysts who pointed out all the hazards,
difficulties and risks of intervention, and by his own
'realist' colleagues, especially from the State and Defence
Departments.
However, as usual, sentiment overruled the various
instrumental rationalists as the media covered the plight of
the refugees extensively and in detail. However, because of
the conflicting actors in the interventionist initiative and
their failure to follow the parameters set out by the African
states in the Nairobi summit of 5 November, in particular the
obligation to free the refugee camps from the control of the
militants and allow the refugees to return to Rwanda, the
rebels initiated a preemptive attack against the interhamwe
and ex-FAR. And suddenly over 500,000 refugees were moving
back to Rwanda. Paradoxically, when the interventionists
determined to be strictly humanitarian, the African states in
Nairobi believed that the inclusion of France meant that the
intervention was certain to be political and one-sided. The
camps would be reinforced and the interhamwe strengthened.
With the dramatic decline in the sentiment for
intervention and with the political obstacles arising against
intervention, the rationale dissolved even though there were
still 750,000 internally displaced Zairians and 500,000
Rwandese and Burundian refugees had (at the time of this
writing) still not been taken care of. Whether the
humanitarian intervention melted into air or was transformed
into something radically other, the opportunity for basing
intervention on norms and rules and for using the crisis to
articulate a consistent rationale was lost.
Without effective rules of the club of nation-states
(excluding those rules which are in the books but are not
enforced), a government can slaughter thousands, tens of
thousands, even hundreds of thousands and millions of its own
citizens without any intervention or with belated interference
by outside powers. States are unwilling to intervene in spite
of prior knowledge of a genocide (such as in Rwanda), military
presence and the legal right to intervene, if there seems to
be no threat to peace and security for the powerful members of
the club or the club itself. (Adelman & Suhrke 1996)
Alternatively, sentiment can arouse the passion for
humanitarian intervention, but one which must be strictly
humanitarian and not get at the root of the problem or involve
any significant risk to the intervenors.
Does this mean that the club of states lacks any abiding
legal rules or moral guides? Not at all. The rules of state
security are clear. Even the rules of economic interests are
clear. Only those rules which ignore security and economic
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interests and attempt to found rules of intervention on a
universal moral order are ignored, except as a moral whipping
tool.
Does this mean states are able to abuse their own
citizens with impunity? Not at all. Because abuse always has
consequences for the other members - the most obvious one
being the flow of refugees into those countries. The legal
norms and the ethical guidelines do exit, but they remain
vague, unarticulated and are not adequately embodied in
international law because the universalists have fought a
rearguard battle on the only turf which they predominated as
they were successfully beaten back with the rise of modernity.
It is time for the rules of the club of nation-states
justifying intervention to be articulated. When and under what
conditions is the abuse of a state of its own citizens, or the
tolerance by state authorities of abuse perpetrated by others,
 to be considered unacceptable to the other members of the
club? On the basis that such abuse threatens the security and
economic well-being of those other members as well as the
continuity of the club in general? In sum, what binds both
failing states and states which attempt to prevent such
failures and the consequences thereof is the common membership
of both types of states in the same club with a set of
articulated and unarticulated rules governing intervention by
one state in the affairs of the other.
The timing for clarifying the rules of membership and the
definition of threats to peace and security is propitious. The
currents of globalization are undermining the strength of the
individual member states as well as the illusion of the
absolute autonomy of each. But, as indicated above, these
historical factors are being used as a rallying cry for the
universalist forces to reimpose a set of universal moral
rules. An articulation of rules which integrate interests and
norms is needed. So are readily available instruments of
intervention and the logistics for delivering them. What is
not needed is policy determined to be ineffectual by the
unreason of realism, or an activist policy determined in an ad
hoc manner by sentimentalism.
To realize such a policy, it will be necessary to reward
risks with honour and glory for the sacrifice. On the other
hand, such a rationale must not become an apologetic for a new
imperialism on the premise of Machiavelli that a state must be
constantly either preparing for war or fighting wars lest the
state implode with the domestic turmoil that always arises in
times of peace (Sullivan 1996, 177: Klare 1992, 37-54)
Humanitarian intervention must be founded on both interests
and norms lest it become the excuse for a messianic complex of
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sacrifice, salvation and redemption in what the military call
low intensity conflicts and what the humanitarians call
complex emergencies. This is the only meaningful route to
escape the negligence and impotence of 1991-2, a period which
set the stage for the radical shifts between indifference or
sentiment towards the Third World that followed.
ENDNOTES
1. Jean Bodin saw the singularity of the nation-state as the
only answer to divided authority between the local polity and
Rome because the "medieval confusion of un-coordinated
independent authorities with residual ties to a distant Pope
or Emperor was a recipe for chaos and bloodshed." Jean Bodin
(1576) De Republica -  Six Books of the Commonwealth (tr. M.J.
Tooley) Oxford: Blackwell. A new system had to replace the old
order of dual jurisdictions. Responsibility had to be given a
locus. As Bodin wrote, "what was required in each state was a
single and ultimate source with 'the power to give the law to
all citizens'."(78)
2. Machiavelli was one of the first political thinkers to
oppose the idea of a centrally directed religious political
authority; he was in favour of political power being
transferred to the merchant-led city-state as opposed to a
third option, a secular imperial centre. Machiavelli believed
that a replication of the pagan Rome of antiquity as the
alternative to medieval Rome would be too large and cumbersome
to manage human political ambitions just as classical Rome had
been. (cf. Sullivan 1996)
3. Establishing this point alone would take a whole book.
Simply think of the debate that was at the intellectual
foundations of modernity - finding a solid foundation for
knowledge in the face of the attack by pyrrhonistic
scepticism. Not the recognition that the quest for knowledge
could have no certain and fixed foundations. It was only with
the latter recognition that we would get the divide between
pure fideism - the path of faith - and mitigated or
constructive scepticism, basing knowledge on reasonableness.
(Popkin 1960, 15) But at the intellectual foundations of
modernity, the choice was between truth authorized by Church
tradition - the status of which required the scepticism of
Erasmus to defend - or the insistence on founding faith on
Truth, as in Martin Luther's 1520 volumes, The Appeal to the
German Nobility and The Babylonian Captivity of the Church. In
those attacks, he established an alternative foundation for
certainty - scripture and faith. Truth and the source of faith
were to be found in scripture, and in order to read scripture
truthfully, one had to have faith. And because it was a
foundation in personal conscience and in using reason to
attack tradition to provide a foundation in faith, the
traditional order was undermined, but the insistence remained
that truth be built on some solid foundation. There was either
faith or a scepticism that either reinforced traditional
institutions or, alternatively, on the Rabelasian path,
undermined any basis of knowledge. Contrast the refugee,
Bruno, until he was captured and executed for heresy, who fled
Catholicism to Calvinism and then Lutheranism, who insisted on
an heroic love for the world soul, the constituent formal
principle of the world, and Petrarch, as in his treatise, On
His Ignorance, where he insists on Christian faith and
Platonic wisdom defended by a sceptical Ciceronian eloquence.
(Kristeller 1964) The university was mired in scholasticism
and organizational chaos, and remained hostile to the currents
of change of the Renaissance which were determined to
establish more solid foundations by a humanist quest to find
deeper foundations in the texts of the classical world in a
universe undergoing rapid change. (Renaudet 1969)
4. For an analysis of the development of 16th century
capitalist agriculture, cf. Wallerstein 1974. For a discussion
of its union with mercantilism to develop capitalist expansion
in the seventeenth century, cf. Wallerstein 1980.
5. Henry Robinson, A Short Answer to A.S. (1645): "nations
denying the right to worship could not properly send their
agents to other nations so discriminated against." R.L. Colie
(1957) Light and the Enlightenment: A Study of the Cambridge
Platonists and the Dutch Arminians, Cambridge: The Cambridge
University Press, 45. Henry More would transform this
practical rationale into a matter of principle and human
justice.
6. In this interpretation, the development of the state
precedes the development of a commercial empire and a global
economy. Wallerstein argued that the state originated as a by-
product of capitalist development. For support for my claim
that the state system is created prior to, but facilitated by
the development of a consolidated capitalist system, cf.
Zolberg (1981).
7. As Australian Chancellor Meternich stated, "States
belonging to the European alliance, which have undergone in
their internal structure an alteration brought about by
revolt, whose consequences may be dangerous to other states,
cease automatically to be members of the alliance. [If such
states] cause neighbouring states to feel an immediate danger,
and if action by the Great powers can be effective and
beneficial, the Great Powers will take steps to bring the
disturbed area back into the European system, first of all by
friendly representations, and secondly by force if force
becomes necessary to this end." (quoted in Weber 1995, 12 from
Palmer and Colton 1971, 490); Palmer, R.R. and J. Colton
(1971) A History of the Modern World, 4th ed. New York: Alfred
Knopf.)
8. "As enforcement operations always overlook the principle of
consent, they are essentially interventionist forces, where
intervention is defined as an attempt to get involved, or
deploy military force, in a conflict without the approval of
all the parties to the conflict. These interventions (Haiti,
northern Iraq, Somalia) appear to have set important legal
precedents." (Makinda 1996, 149)
9. The intervention in northern Iraq was not undertaken "to
protect Kurds from dictatorial rule" (Makinda 1996, 157-8),
though that may have been the effect. (Cf. Adelman 1992b and
1992c and the commentary of Laberge in Ethics and
International Affairs, 1995) Contrary to the wishful thinking
of many grotians and utopians, there is no indication that
"the UN is probably ready to implement a broader concept of
security that, among other things, includes economic
development, societal institutions, and good governance."
(Makinda 1996, 164)
10. "(T)oday and for the foreseeable future, the only
international civilization worthy of the name is the governing
economic culture of the world market. Despite the view of some
contemporary observers, the forces of globalization have
successfully resisted partition into cultural camps."
(Rosecrance 1996, 45)
11."Economic globalization has placed constraints upon the
autonomy of states. More and more, national debts are foreign
debts so that states have to be attentive to external bond
markets and to externally-influenced interest rates in
determining their own economic policies. The level of national
economic activity also depends upon access to foreign markets.
Participation in various international 'regimes' channels the
activities of states in developed capitalist countries into
conformity with global economy processes, tending toward a
stabilization of the world capitalist economy." (Cox 1993b,
262)
12. "We have entered a time of global transition marked by
uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental
associations of States are evolving ways to deepen cooperation
and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign
and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are blurred
by advanced communications and global commerce, and by
decisions of States to yield some sovereign prerogatives to
larger, common political associations. At the same time,
however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty
spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal
ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife.
Social peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions
of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of
terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through
democratic means." (Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 11, 41-2)
13. "Globalization is generating a more complex multi-level
world political system, which implicitly challenges the old
Westphalian assumption that a state is a state is a state.
Structures of authority comprise not one but at least three
levels: the macro-regional level, the old state (or
Westphalian) level, and the micro-regional level. All three
levels are limited in their possibilities by a global economy
which has means of exerting its pressures without formally
authoritative political structures." (Cox 1993b, 263)
14. "The rapid growth and maturation of the multicentric world
can in good part be traced to the extraordinary dynamism and
expansion of the global economy. And so can the weakening of
the state, which is no longer the manager of the national
economy and has become, instead, an instrument for adjusting
the national economy to the exigencies of an expanding world
economy." (Rosenau 1992, 27)
15. At the time of the Rwanda genocide, 45% of UN assistance
was devoted to humanitarian rather than development purposes.
(Cf. UNDP (1994) "Emergencies Consuming Nearly Half of UN
Assistance," Africa Recovery, 8:1-2.
16. "Restructuring is depriving the state of its ability to
regulate economic life, furthering the outflow and internal
concentration of wealth." (Mittleman 1996, 209)
17. "As economic interests expand and the domestic economy
becomes a derivative of the global economy, the nation-state
is placed in a difficult and contradictory position. It must
in neoliberal societies...promote the efficiency of global
resource exploitation and at the same time meet an expanding
array of domestic responsibilities." (Mason 1994, 17) The
global market on its own seems merely to exacerbate the
problems we apparently face as no substitute appears able to
take over the role of the state, and the state's ability to
control even its own monetary and fiscal policies is eroded.
18. The first is a point Edmond J. Keller makes in his
introduction (p. 11) and Donald Rothchild makes in his
conclusion (p. 228) of their edited volume (1996). Ibrahim A.
Gambari makes the latter point in his article in that volume,
"The Role of Regional and Global Organizations in Addressing
Africa's Security Issues." (p. 29)
19. Brown (1996b, 573), for example, identifies four main
cluster of factors which compare somewhat to and have a large
overlap with the four underlying causes I identify: an
economic crisis, weak institutions, social segmentation, and
proneness to violence. He identifies "structural factors such
as weak states, security concerns, and ethnic geography;
political factors such as discriminatory political
institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group
politics, and elite politics; economic/social factors such as
widespread economic problems, discriminatory economic systems,
and economic development and modernization; and
cultural/perceptual factors such as patterns of cultural
discrimination and problematic group histories." Proximate
causes are but the acceleration of the underlying causes as
can be seen in the comparative chart Brown (1996b, 577 Table
17.1)
20. "(W)e now live in a world which is characterized by the
growing global integration of production and financial
structures, complex communications grids, the rapid innovation
and diffusion of technology and the possible emergence of
associated forms of consciousness (my italics), as well as
changes in security structures and strategic alignments."
(Gill 1993, 7)
21. "In a context of a globalized world economy, the
territoriality of the state is significant not as the source
of quasi-ontological needs and desires but because the state
is the primary political organizational mechanism of social
order and transformation." (Palan 1994, 46)
22. (C)onflict prevention efforts should focus very
aggressively on the decisions and actions of domestic elites,
who are usually responsible for sparking internal
conflicts...Those interested in conflict prevention need to
think systematically about ways of neutralizing the ethnic
bashing, ethnic skapegoating, hate-mongering, and
propagandizing that are often the precursors to violence."
(Brown 1996b, 599)
23. Very few international theorists pay attention to what is
generally known as "chaos" theory, even though they are
preoccupied with crises. One exception is Michael Nicholson
(1996) pp. 37-43. "Small changes in the area around the
bifurcation point lead to major changes in the system's
behaviour." p. 39.
24. This is often referred to as the butterfly effect. "If a
butterfly flies from one buttercup to another in June in
England instead of staying put, the minute change in the
climate 'causes' a hurricane in the Caribbean in the following
year." (Nicholson 1996, 43)
25. For the best introduction to the chaos theory of the
Brussels school, cf. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers,
Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature, New York:
Bantam, 1984, or Prigogine's earlier more mathematical
version, From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the
Physical Sciences, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company.
For a model on how these systems produce greater order instead
of chaos, cf. the combined work of the Danish scientist, Per
Bak and his Chinese colleague, Kan Chen, and their theory of
'self-organized criticality.' (Cf. their article by that same
name in Scientific American, January 1991, 46-53, or their
earlier short version with Michael Creutz, "Self-Organized
Criticality in the 'Game of Life'" in Nature, 342:6251, 780-2,
December 14, 1989. Whereas environmental realists stress the
mechanical sub-state (Homer-Dixon), inter-state (classical
realists), and larger macro civilizational factors that need
to be kept in equilibrium, and idealists and liberal
internationalists stress the values and institutions that
ought to be put in place to prevent the system from spinning
out of control, this theory essentially argues that the
factors for producing a higher level of order are to be found
within the complex system itself. What is most important is
detecting the critical point at which a system can go from
relative stability to catastrophe. Let me illustrate this with
a simple childhood model. When we as children were fascinated
with building sand castles on the sea shore, we pile the sand
and introduce water to create a packing effect so that the
sand can be carved. But as we pile the sand higher or
introduce water into the moat, the pieces of the wall tend to
collapse into the moat. The key trick is to continue building
larger and larger. We reinforce falls and avalanches as we go,
but not to add too much so that the castle suddenly, and
irretrievably collapses in a catastrophic event that children
actually delight in because it allows them to vent their
furies and totally destroy the product of their own
creativity. But the higher stage is reached when we do not
destroy the products of our own creativity, but recognize how
to preserve the castle in a critical state, at least until we
leave the beach to the vagaries of wind and water. Until that
point, we need to keep a wary eye on introducing too much sand
or water. The trick to maintaining relative stability is to
maintain a system at a sub-critical state rather than
producing a supercritical state where a single gain of sand
can destroy everything invested into a situation. As shall
become clear, I am not a naturalist who is willing to let
nature take its course to see if order emerges out of chaos
spontaneously as it were. Quite the reverse. Humans are imbued
with a spirit, a geist, which allows them to increase order by
countering the downward trend of entropy. In that sense, I
share a kinship with the idealists. But like the realists, I
do not believe in introducing values and institutions ab
extra, but instead see the importance of using elements
already in a situation to use a bifurcation point to create a
higher level order. Humans, like God, are the intervenors in
balancing chance and necessity to create greater order. One
final point. The use of scientific analogies is not intended
to suggest that international relations can be understood in
the same way that the nature of the universe is grasped in the
laws of physics. The use of the language of physics is only
intended to be metaphorical.
26. Though 'chaos" is used here analogically, it also tries to
use the analogy accurately in reference to the key elements of
chaos theory. Thus, though on the one hand, language is being
used metaphorically, hopefully it is not obscurantist and
confusing. For a satire on the misuse of chaos theory to posit
a relativist world in which reflection is merely an exercise
in subjective projection, see the article by Alan D. Sokal
(1996) "Transgressing the Boundaries - Toward a Transformative
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity," Social Text, Spring/Summer,
217-252, and the commentary by Steven Weinberg (1996) "Sokal's
Hoax," New York Review of Books, XLIII:13, August 8, 11-15.
27. As Ilya Prigogine put it so succinctly, "Matter at
equilibrium is blind. Far from equilibrium it begins to see."
(Prigogine 1993, 20) At equilibrium, we see, but we only see
what we have brought to the situation in the first place.
Thus, for example, Wallerstein, the brilliant creator of
worlds system theory, lays stress on an equilibrium model in
which the basic units of analysis are geographical: core,
semi-peripheral and peripheral zones in the world-economy.
There is a dialectic between the global transformative
processes of capitalism and the preservation propensities of
states to maintain the status quo while the globalization
continually undermines that effort to produce a new
equilibrium level by altering the character of the sub-state
units - classes, peoples, and households. Neo-structuralists
may amend the model by allowing us to see power and self
interest at work as dynamic and not just passive elements.
Idealist utopians may point to the absence of an effective
international authority. But the real issue may be to allow
the forces in play to see themselves. The key may not be
providing explanations for those who are victimized or engaged
in victimization, but to set up a process whereby they can
discover themselves what is wrong.
28. (Schraeder 1994, 107) This was even true of the African
pro-active Carter administration. "(D)espite a stated
commitment to human rights and the need to decrease ties with
authoritarian dictatorships, the Carter administration largely
failed to follow through on the promise in 1977 in the case of
Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire (see Chapter 3). Rather strong
rhetoric in the first year of the administration gave way to
inaction and acceptance of a consensus within the national
security bureaucracies that Mobutu's fall would yield chaos
and instability." Ibid, p. 7.
29. Cf. Kaplan (1996) who, in  describing the great temple at
Angkor Wat, aptly captures this age-old approach. "(D)warfing
human beings out of all proportion, were seventy sandstone
colossi, about thirty-five demons lining one side of a bridge
leading to the entrance of the medieval city, and thirty-five
gods on the other side. These turbaned sandstone giants, each
blotched with lichen, were pulling on the elongated body of
the 'cosmic serpent,' or Naga, which serves as a kind of
butter churn - separating out the solid world and is social
structures from the mythical 'milk of chaos'." p. 424.
30. Cf. Holland, John H. (1995) Hidden Order: How Adaptation
Builds Complexity, Reading: Addison-Wesley.
31. It is interesting that in George (1993), the primary gap
between theory and practice is between realist theorists and
realist practitioners. "(P)ractitioners find it difficult to
make much use of academic approaches such as structural
realist theory and game theory, which assume that all state
actors are alike and can be expected to behave the same way in
given situations, and which rest on the simple, uncomplicated
assumption that states can be regarded as rational unitary
actors. On the contrary, practitioners believe they need to
work with actor-specific models...that grasp the different
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